Abstract-We consider a population of dynamic agents, also referred to as players. The state of each player evolves according to a linear stochastic differential equation driven by a Brownian motion and under the influence of a control and an adversarial disturbance. Every player minimizes a cost functional which involves quadratic terms on state and control plus a crosscoupling mean-field term measuring the congestion resulting from the collective behavior, which motivates the term "crowd-averse". For this game we first illustrate the paradigm of robust mean-field games. Second, we provide a new approximate solution approach based on the extension of the state space and prove the existence of equilibria and their stability properties.
I. INTRODUCTION
We illustrate the robust mean-field game approach on a population of dynamic agents that wish to regulate their state to zero. Each agent's state evolves according to a linear stochastic differential equation (SDE) driven by a Brownian motion and under the influence of a control and an adversarial disturbance. The control minimizes a cost functional which involves quadratic terms on state and control plus a cross-coupling meanfield term involving the control of the single player and the average control computed over all players. Such a term allows the redistribution of the control load away from peak "hours" thus reducing congestion, from which the term "crowd-averse". Indeed every player pays a cost from controlling its own system when the population as a whole has a high average control. Based on the provided mean-field game formulation we analyze both the microscopic evolution of each player and the macroscopic evolution of the system as a whole.
We highlight two main contributions. First, we establish a robust mean-field system for the considered game under adversarial disturbances. Second, we provide a new approximate solution approach based on the extension of the state space in the same spirit as [14] , [15] . The proposed method relies only on the solution of a differential Riccati equation.
Mean-field games were formulated by Lasry and Lions in [10] and independently by M.Y. Huang, P. E. Caines and R. Malhamé in [7] , [8] . The mean-field theory of dynamical games is a modeling framework at the interface of differential game theory, mathematical physics, and H ∞ -optimal control that tries to capture the mutual influence between a crowd and its individuals. Mean-field games arise in several application domains such as economics, physics, biology, and network engineering (see [1] , [5] , [6] , [8] , [9] , [13] , [17] ).
From a mathematical point of view the mean-field approach leads to a system of two PDEs. The first PDE is the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. The second PDE is the Fokker-Planck equation which describes the density of the players [10] , [16] . Explicit solutions in terms of mean-field equilibria are not common unless the problem has a linear-quadratic structure, see [3] . In this sense, a variety of solution schemes has been recently proposed based on discretization and/or numerical approximations [1] . More recently, robustness and risk-sensitivity have been brought into the picture of mean-field games [4] , [16] , where the first PDE is now the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI) equation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we formulate the problem. In Section III we provide some motivations. In Section IV we derive the meanfield game. In Section V we introduce the approximate solution approach and study equilibria and stability properties. In Section VI we carry out some numerical studies. Finally in Section VII we provide some conclusions. Notation We denote by (Ω, F, P) a complete probability space. We let B be a finite-dimensional Brownian motion defined on this probability space. Let F = (F t ) t≥0 be its natural filtration augmented by all the P−null sets (sets of measure-zero with respect to P).
We use ∂ x and ∂ 2 xx to denote the first and second partial derivatives with respect to x, respectively.
II. PROBLEM SET-UP
Consider a game with an infinite number of homogeneous players. For each player let x 0 be its initial state, which is realized according to the probability distribution m 0 . The state of the player at time t, denoted by x t ∈ R, evolves according to a controlled stochastic process over a finite horizon T > 0, i.e.
where u t ∈ R is the control input, B t ∈ R is a Brownian motion, which is independent of the initial state x 0 , and independent across players and time. The constants α ∈ R, β ∈ R and σ ∈ R are parameters, and ζ t ∈ R is an adversarial disturbance.
To introduce a macroscopic description of the game consider probability density functions on the state and control spaces:
Define now the average state and control distributions at time t as
Finally we introduce a cost functional with penalty on the final state g(·), stage cost function c(·), and quadratic penalty on the unknown disturbance:
where m t = m(x t , t) and z t = z(x t , t). Players wish to stabilize their state to zero, and therefore we can select the stage cost
with h ≥ 0. The term The mean of the state is generated by
Considering deterministic disturbance ζ t , and using indistinguishability, the mean of the average control evolves according to:
A relation between d dtm t andm t is yet to be introduced. However, we will see later that both d dtm t and ζ t can be approximated by linear functions inm t and therefore we can rewritē
for somek ∈ R. The above preamble leads to the following robust mean-field game problem. Problem 1: (Robust mean-field problem) Let x 0 be independent of B and with density m 0 (x). Let m * t be the optimal mean-field trajectory. The robust meanfield problem in R and (0, T ] is given by
III. MOTIVATIONS
In what follows we provide three different interpretations of the problem.
Example 1: (Inventory control with shared setup costs [13] ) In multi-retailer inventory control equation (1) describes the evolution of the inventory over time. The control is the reordered quantity and the disturbance is the unknown market demand. A classical scenario is where the transportation cost is shared among all retailers who reorder at a given time instant. A certain level of coordination of the retailers' replenishment strategies may lead to individual costs reduction. The cross mean-field term in the objective function (2) accounts for the reduced cost when orders are placed jointly. The other two terms are usually the costs of reordering and shortage or the holding costs on inventory. We can generalize the framework to any application where multiple players share a service facility as airport facilities or telephone systems, drilling for oil, cooperative farming, and fishing (see also the references on cost-sharing games in [13] ).
Example 2: (Dynamic demand management in power grids [2] , [12] ) Players are electrical appliances, say for instance heating or cooling appliances, and their state is their temperature at a given time. Each appliance can be in one of two states, ON or OFF. The dynamics (1) describe the time evolution of the temperature of each appliance. Each controller is given a cost function that accounts for i) the energy consumption, which is captured by the penalty on the control, ii) the deviation of the mains frequency from the nominal value, represented by the cross-term, and iii) the deviation of the agent's temperature from the reference value, described by the penalty on the state. With respect to goal ii), the cross mean-field term incentivizes the appliances to switch OFF if the mains frequency is below the nominal value and to switch ON if the mains frequency is above the nominal value.
Example 3: (Oil production [4] , [6] ) Suppose we have a finite number of oil producers, and let the state be the stock of raw material available at a given time. Let the control be the produced oil quantity by a single producer and the adversarial disturbance be a cautious disturbance parameter reflecting the taxation or inflation on the produced quantity. Equation (1) is widely used in stock market models to describe the variation of the reserve at time t given the current reserve and the consumed resource quantity. The term σ t ζ t is captures the negative and uncertain influence of taxation, or inflation, on the production. The cost functional,km t is the sale's price of oil and the crossterm is related to the income collected from producing and selling the quantity u t ;
2 accounts for a production energy consumed, a > 0 and bu 2 t is a known linear taxation on production. The penalty on the final state g(x T ) can be assumed quadratic in the reserve, so that unexploited reserve at the end of the horizon is penalized.
IV. THE RESULTING MEAN-FIELD GAMES
Let v t (x t ) be the (upper) value of the robust optimization problem under worst-case disturbance starting at time t from state x t . Let the corresponding Hamiltonian be given by
where p is the co-state. Then the mean-field system associated to the robust mean-field game introduced in Problem 1 is given by
where d(x) is the initial population state distribution and g the terminal payoff. Any solution of the above system of equations is referred to as worst-disturbance feedback mean-field equilibrium. We are ready to specialize the results obtained above to the case of a crowd-averse system. Theorem 1: The mean-field system associated to the robust mean-field game for the crowd-averse system is described by the equations:
Furthermore, the optimal control and worst disturbance are
The significance of the above result is that to find the optimal control input we need to solve the two coupled PDEs in (5) in v t and m t with given boundary conditions. This is usually done by iteratively solving the HJBI equation for fixed m t and by entering the optimal u t obtained from (6) in the FPK equation in (5), until a fixed point in v t and m t is reached.
Since the Bellman equation depends explicitly on the mean of the mean-field and not on the other moments, one can reduce the mean-field system to a lower dimensional system. The reduced mean-field system associated to the robust mean-field game for the problem under study is
whereū * t =z t is the mean of the optimal individual state feedback control andd is the mean of the initial distribution of the agents states.
V. MEAN-FIELD EQUILIBRIUM AND STABILITY
In this section we study the problem in the extended state space involving both the state of the player and the average state distribution. The main idea is illustrated in Fig. 1 . In the mean-field system (7) the gradient ∂ x v t is parametrized in the average distributionm t , which evolves according to a nonlinear differential equation. Then, we replace the dynamics ofm t with two linear dynamics on the new variableŝ m t andm t (dashed and dotted trajectories) that upper and lower bound the nonlinear dynamics ofm t (solid). In the extended state space, the state variable evolves according to the equations
which can be rewritten in matrix form as
For this system we introduce an assumption on the rate of convergence of the statem t . Assumption 1: There exists θ such that
The above assumption implies that there exists a variablem t which approximates the average distribution from below and that evolves according to
By substituting the current average distributionm t by its estimatem t the extended state dynamics takes the form
Given the above dynamics we summarize the problem at hand as
where s = hk by equation (3) . Reformulating the problem in terms of the extended state
yields the linear quadratic problem:
The idea is therefore to consider a new value function V t (x,m) (in compact form V t (X)) in the extended state space which satisfies
Assume that V T (X) is given by the quadratic form
where the matrix P (t) is the solution of the differential Riccati equatioṅ
where
Note that in the stationary case the above differential equation simplifies to
Let P (t) be the solution of the differential Riccati equation (12), then the optimal control is given bỹ
and the worst disturbance is
(15)
A. Exponential asymptotic stability
The stochastic differential equation describing the closed-loop system has an exponentially and asymptotically stable equilibrium. To see this from (14)- (15) rewrite the dynamics for x t in (8) as
and consider the following assumption, ensuring the evolution of the state is bounded from above by an exponential decay.
Assumption 2: There exists κ > 0 such that
The analysis is then performed within the framework of stochastic stability theory [11] . To this end consider the infinitesimal generator
and the Lyapunov function V (x) = x 2 . The stochastic derivative of V (x) is obtained by applying (17) to V (x), which yields 
B. Mean-field equilibrium
Let Assumption 2 hold. We can approximate the mean-field equilibrium, which is captured by the evolution ofm t over the horizon (0, T ], as follows:
which yields the upper bound form t :
Essentially, the inequality above describes converging linear dynamics which upper bound the time evolution ofm t , for all t ∈ (0, T ]. As a result
Actually, we can derive a differential equation describing the evolution of the mean distribution which represents a bound, namely
The equation above corresponds to saying that the mean distribution converges exponentially to zero in absence of the stochastic disturbances (the Brownian motion), under the assumption that ρ is strictly negative.
VI. NUMERICAL STUDIES
Consider a system of n = 10 3 indistinguishable players, with dynamics (1). The players seek to minimise cost functionals of the form (2) subject to an adversary disturbance, i.e. consider Problem 1. The optimal control and worst-case disturbance are given by (6) . The approximate solutions given by the control (14) and the disturbance (15) are adopted, where the matrix P = diag{ P 11 (m) , q 4θ }, with P 11 (m) = (σ 2 + 2α) 2 + 8(
, is the positive definite solution to the algebraic Riccati equation (13) . Simulations have been run for two different values of σ, namely σ 0 = 0, σ 1 = 0.1. The selection σ = σ 0 corresponds to the case in which there is no disturbance and the dynamics (1) is deterministic. The simulations have also been run for two different values of s, namely s 1 = 0.5 and s 2 = 1.5 Recall that large values of s correspond to large penalties when congestion occurs. The remainder of the parameters are α = 0.1, β = 2, a = 2, b = 1, θ = 10, q = 0.1, γ = 1,m 0 = 80. Figures 2 and 3 show the time histories of the states and the control actions (14) of the players, respectively, with the weights s = s 1 (top row) and s = s 2 (bottom row) and the paramters σ = σ 0 (left column) and σ = σ 1 (right column). In all four cases the players successfully drive their states to zero. However, for a given value of s, the convergence fastest in the absence of noise and disturbances, i.e. when σ = σ 0 . The simulations show that for a given value of σ it takes more time for the players to drive their states to zero when the parameter s = s 2 is selected in place of s = s 1 . 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have illustrated robust mean-field games as a paradigm for crowd-averse systems. Future directions include i) the extension of the approximation method to more general cost functionals, ii) the study of the case with "local" mean-field interactions rather than "global" as in the current scenario, and iii) the analysis of crowd-seeking scenarios in contrast to the crowdaverse cases analyzed in this paper.
